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Abstract 
This study investigates the impact of dynamic relationship by the presence of a lagged leverage decision (LEVEt-1) to leverage 
decision. Dynamic panel model is developed to identify the possible effect of previous leverage decision on leverage adjustments 
speed of publicly listed companies in Malaysia for the period of 2004-2013.  The dynamic panel results show that Malaysian public 
listed companies adjust debt and the speed of adjustment is approximately 21% to 26% per annum (System Generalized Method 
of Moments). This indicates that Malaysian public listed firms adjust their leverage and change their financing following temporary 
deviations from target in order to return leverage towards its optimum. This study contributes to firm leverage decisions by 
estimating the mean reversion towards target which is absent specifically in Malaysia context. Critically, the results of this study 
pave the way for a more advanced and mixed method approach to firm leverage decision in Malaysia. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the past 50 years, most of the financial researchers have advanced theoretical models to explain the financial 
structure pattern and also figure out whether the theoretical models have explanatory power in the real business world 
(Chen, 2004). One of the issues which are often faced by finance managers is the determinants of financial structure. 
A false financing decision may lead to financial distress and eventually bankruptcy (Eriotis et al., 2007). It is suggested 
that utilization of different levels of debt and equity in the firm’s financial structure is one of the firm-specific strategy 
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used by managers in searching for performance improvement (Gleason et al., 2000). Even though there are theories 
and empirical researches suggest there is an optimal capital structure, there is no specified method to help the finance 
managers to decide an optimal leverage level (Eriotis et al., 2007). Thus, finance managers are primarily concern 
about whether their firm are overleveraged or underleveraged, and much less concerned about the precise optimal 
level of debt. There are many studies have been conducted to compare the traditional theories in firm financial structure 
decision. The most common comparison is between Trade-off Theory (TOT) and Pecking Order Theory (POT) 
(Chirinko and Singha, 2000; Fama and French, 2002; Shyam-Sunder and C Myers, 1999; Tong and Green, 2005). 
However, developments in literature imply that financial structure decision could result an optimal leverage level by 
maximizing its value. This explains that firms target their financial structure and amend their financing following 
temporary deviations from target towards its optimal level (Ebrahim et al., 2014). By employing traditional panel 
model, the adjustment of leverage is instantaneous albeit incompatible with real-life situation. In contrast, dynamic 
panel models is able to incorporate a gradual process of adjustment.  
Moreover, dynamic capital structure model (Abdeljawad et al., 2013; Ebrahim et al., 2014; Flannery and Hankins, 
2013) provides a promising explanation through a new perspective on the movement of firms’ financing decision. 
There are many studies have been conducted to compare the traditional theories in firm leverage decision (Ebrahim 
et al., 2014). On the other hand, various determinants of leverage adjustments speed only focus macroeconomic 
variables such as cash flow and leverage adjustments (Faulkender et al., 2012); types of corporation (Park et al., 2013); 
firm and industry levels (Gungoraydinoglu and Öztekin, 2011); internal capital markets (Fier et al., 2013); 
macroeconomic conditions (Cook and Tang, 2010); institutional ownership (Öztekin and Flannery, 2012); corporate 
governance (Chang et al., 2014). This paper follows Ebrahim et al. (2014) by employing dynamic panel model on the 
possible effect of previous leverage decision and their effects on leverage adjustments speed in Malaysia. Based on 
the above statements, this study is designed to estimate the dynamic relationship by the presence of a lagged leverage 
decision (LEVEt-1) to leverage decision. It is hope that to bridge the gap and shed some lights to the literature, 
specifically in Malaysia. 
Hence, this paper attempts to fill the methodological gaps by employing dynamic panel models to leverage 
decision of publicly listed companies in Malaysia for the period of 2004-2013. Following the suggestions made in the 
literature (Ebrahim et al., 2014; Flannery and Hankins, 2013; González et al., 2011), this study will contribute to 
firms’ leverage decisions by estimating the mean reversion towards target though consensus which is absent, 
specifically in Malaysia context.  
 
2. Literature Review  
Empirical studies have provided answers by estimating the mean aversion towards target through dynamic panel 
models of corporate leverage. Welch (2004) does not find any evidence where firms could adjust their leverage 
towards target leverage. However, Fama and French (2002) agree that firms adjust between 7 and 18 per cent annually. 
Other than that, Flannery and Rangan (2006) use three main hypotheses based on TOT, POT and Market Timing 
Theory (MTT) and conclude an adjustment speed above 30 per cent. Consistently, Lemmon et al., 2008 find that the 
majority of variation in leverage ratios is driven by an unobserved time-invariant effect that generates surprisingly 
stable leverage decision and estimate about 25 per cent each year of adjustment. Additionally, Huang and Ritter (2009) 
find that firms adjust toward target leverage at a moderate speed, with a half-life of 3.7 years for book leverage. In 
UK, Ozkan (2001) uses partial adjustment model to estimate leverage decision determinants by employing GMM 
estimation procedure. The results suggest that firms have long-term target borrowing ratios and they adjust to their 
target ratios relatively for an unbalanced panel of 390 UK firms over the period of 1984–1996. Consistently, in U.S, 
Dang et al. (2012) agree that firms rely heavily on external funds to offset large financing deficits and their higher 
adjustment speeds may be driven by lower adjustment costs that are shared with the transaction costs of accessing 
external capital markets. In Istanbul, Arioglu and Tuan (2014) estimate the speed of adjustment for leverage ratios 
following TOT. The results shows that the speed of adjustment as approximately 29 per cent and it is consistent with 
the prediction of TOT, which suggests that firms follow target capital structures and when the firms' leverage ratios 
deviate from these targets. In Thailand, Tongkong (2012) employs dynamic panel regression model using one-step 
and two-step Arellano and Bond GMM estimation methods in determining the speed of adjustment towards target 
capital structure. The findings indicate that firm leverage is positively related to median industry leverage for 39 Thai 
companies in real estate industry listed in the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) during the period 2002 to 2009. 
In Malaysia, Haron (2014) investigates the existence of target capital structure, speed of adjustment and factors 
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affecting speed of adjustment for 790 non-financial listed firms in 2000 to 2009. The finding indicates that firms do 
adjust to be at their target from time to time with a considerably rapid speed of adjustment, in line with dynamic TOT. 
The study also concludes a negative relationship between the speed of adjustment and distance from target leverage 
suggesting fast adjustment if not being far from target in Malaysia. Consistently, Ebrahim et al. (2014) investigate the 
effect of political patronage on firm’s leverage decision in Malaysia. The finding from system GMM estimation of a 
dynamic partial adjustment model implies that leverage is estimated to adjust to target at a rate of approximately 28 
per cent annually. The result also shows a significant difference in the leverage decision of patronized firms relative 
to non-connected firms during financial crisis for the period 1998-2001. Meanwhile, Abdeljawad et al. (2013) find a 
different conclusion where Malaysian firms are adjusting their leverage to the target but at a slow rate of 12.7 percent. 
Other than that, they also demonstrate that overleveraged firms adjust to the target faster than underleveraged firms 
(29.4 per cent versus 13.1 per cent) due to the asymmetry of the benefits of being at the target. The dynamic behaviour 
for firms far from the target and firms close to the target is different which is expected as greater deviation from the 
target makes it more critical for the firm to adjust.  
Other than that, Piaw and Jais (2012) intend to identify what constitutes organizational-environmental fit to the 
contingent leverage decision in Malaysia and how fast they had adjusted towards their contingent leverage decision 
in the aftermath of the crisis. However, they point out that while Malaysia has successfully sustained the firms’ 
leverage to a lower level, it is not so successful to ensure speedy adjustment given its rigorous institutional settings 
and also access to financial and capital market during The Asian Financial Crisis 1997. 
In summary, the literature documents those certain firms characteristic and macroeconomic condition have a 
significant positive or negative relationship in determining a company’s leverage policy based on the traditional capital 
structure theories. Therefore, the study attempts to further investigating this relationship in Malaysia with the updated 
data and improved methodology. Based on the statements above, the hypothesis is developed as: 
 
H1: The lagged firm leverage decision has a significantly impact to the firm leverage decision. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Sources of Data 
 
To form the sample, this study consists of all corporations listed in the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia (Stock 
Exchange of Malaysia) as at 30 September 2013. Then, the study deletes firms from finance, insurance and unit trust 
companies due to differences in regulatory requirement that pertain to them. From 793 companies, the study then 
screens through the data and after removing the unavailable data, the final sample is 183 firms. The sample period of 
study is ten years from January 2004 until December 2013 and we employ a balanced panel data. 
 
3.2 Variables and measurement 
 
We explain the explanatory variable and control variables in this section. 
 
Explanatory variable: Leverage (LEVE) is the ratio of total debts to total assets. This indicator captures the 
characteristics of firm’s indebtedness (Anderson and Hsiao, 1981; Rajan and Zingales, 2012). Given the observed 
differences in the composition of debt, before undertaking any investigation of leverage it is appropriate to define 
what we mean by this term. Clearly, the extent of leverage and the most relevant measure depends on the objective of 
the analysis. A more appropriate definition of financial leverage is provided by the ratio of debt (both short term and 
long term) to total assets. This can be viewed as a proxy for what is left for shareholders in case of liquidation (Rajan 
and Zingales, 2012). This measure manages to incorporate the fact that firms’ assets that are levered partly by its debt 
or liabilities. For example, an increase in the gross amount of trade credit or account payable is reflected in an 
increment of this measure of leverage. Therefore, it could fully reflect the gearing condition by the firm. 
Control variables:  In addition, the paper also controls for ownership structure mechanism and firm 
characteristics based on the previous studies in order to enhance the models. Five control variables are included in the 
dynamic panel model, to account for the joint impact of lagged leverage decision to firm leverage decision. (1) 
Ownership concentration (OC5). Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Ehikioya (2009) use the fraction of shares held by 
the five largest shareholders as a measure of concentration in ownership structure. Therefore, the study follows the 
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same measurement of ownership concentration as percentage of shares owned by the largest five shareholders in a 
firm and classify it as ownership concentration 5 (OC5). (2) Return on assets (ROA). ROA is assessing firm’s 
profitability, hence, the study uses the value of the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. More 
profitable firms not only have lower cost of bankruptcy and financial distress, but also seem to have efficient 
management (Ting and Lean, 2011). (3) Firm size (SIZE). Following Rajan and Zingales (2012), SIZE is measured 
by the natural log of sales. (4) Tangibility (TANG). It is the ratio of tangibility assets (the sum of fixed assets and 
inventories) to total assets (Ting and Lean, 2011). (5) Growth (GROWTH). Following (Rajan and Zingales, 2012), 
GROWTH is measured as the annual percentage change in total sales. Moreover, as Yit (refer to leverage) is a function 
of fixed effect, the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term (Baltagi, 2008). To make the explanatory 
variables endogenous; Yit is correlated with its lagged (Yt-1).We estimate the dynamic relationship by adding the lagged 
leverage (LEVEt-1) to the model. Following Öztekin and Flannery (2012), we also add time effect variable (Σαi Yeari) 
to control for time-specific factors. This study also controls for industry-specific factors that influence leverage 
decision by adding dummy variables of industry (Σαt Industryt) in the model. 
Thus, to estimate the dynamic relationship by the presence of a lagged leverage decision (LEVEt-1) to leverage 
decision, we establish dynamic panel model as follows: 
 
0 1 , -1 2 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 ,5it i t it i t i t i t i t i i t t
it
LEVE LEVE OC ROA SIZE TANG GROWTH Year IndustryD D D D D D D D D
H
        

¦ ¦
 
where subscripts i and t represent the firm and time respectively. αi, i = 1 to 6, are coefficients of the respective 
variables; εit is error term. 
 
4. Findings and Analysis 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for all measures used in our panel model analysis of all the 183 firms.  
With respect to the LEVE as measurement of firm leverage, the reported means for LEVE is 0.449 revealing that the 
average liabilities are about 44.90 per cent of total assets value for the sample of Malaysian firms studied. The 
descriptive statistics also indicates the five largest shareholders are holding 69.3 per cent of the company’s shares in 
average and the samples are considered as having high ownership concentration. The mean ROA of 0.046 indicates 
that 4.6 per cent of profit is generated from total assets. Firm size of 12.231 shows that sales of firm is RM12.231 
million in average. About 52.0 per cent of firm’s total assets are made up of fixed assets. Finally, firm average growth 
for the observed period is about 0.3 per cent. 
 
 Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean SD Maximum Minimum 
LEVE 0.449 0.329 0.992 0.010 
OC5 0.693 0.153 1.000 0.000 
ROA 0.046 0.120 0.723 -1.390 
SIZE 12.231 1.487 16.616 2.398 
TANG 0.520 0.034 0.990 -0.633 
GROWTH 0.003 0.040 0.230 -1.000 
 
4.2 Correction Analysis 
 
Pearson correlation test is applied to test the relationship among the variables. The results of correlation analysis 
which examining the magnitude among the regressors are shown in Table 2. Generally, there is a significantly negative 
correction between LEVE and OC5 (P < 0.01), ROA (P < 0.01) and TANG (P < 0.01). In addition, as the values of 
correlation coefficients are all below 0.6 in absolute terms, indicating there is no evidence of multicollinearity amongst 
the variables. Hence, no variables should be excluded from the multivariate analysis (O’brien, 2007).  
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 Table 2: Corrections matrix 
 LEVE OC5 ROA SIZE TANG GROWTH 
LEVE 1.000      
OC5 -0.463*** 1.000     
ROA -0.277*** 0.063*** 1.000    
SIZE 0.003 0.099*** 0.255*** 1.000   
TANG -0.475*** 0.064*** 0.042* -0.022 1.000  
GROWTH 0.015 0.065 0.197*** -0.017 -0.021 1.000 
Notes: * and *** indicate statistical significance, at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 
4.3 Dynamic Panel Regression Results (GMM) 
 
We employ System Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to estimate the dynamic leverage decision model 
for all firms from 2004 to 2013. System GMM is used to estimate the partial adjustment model to control for 
endogeneity which could arise in dynamic model. Table 3 shows the dynamic panel model results. Following Arellano 
and Bond (1991), the study conducts post estimation specification tests for over-identifying restrictions. The Sargan 
Test (P > 0.05) indicates that over-identifying restrictions are valid. The presence of first order serial correlation and 
absence of second order serial correlation imply the model is consistent with the GMM theory. LEVEt-1 is the 
coefficient for the lagged dependent variable and is significant at the 1 per cent level. From the values of coefficient, 
0.740 (One-step System GMM) and 0.789 (Two-step System GMM), it indicates that Malaysian public listed firms 
adjust leverage towards an optimal level and the speed of adjustment is approximately 21 per cent to 26 per cent per 
annum.  
 
 Table 3: Dynamic Panel Data Analysis (System GMM) 
Variables One-step System GMM Two-step System GMM 
Intercept -1.961***(-5.83) -2.226*** (-5.55) 
LEVEt-1 0.740***(11.41) 0.789***(17.83) 
OC5 0.425*** (3.48) 0.176*** (3.33) 
ROA -0.107*** (-7.82) -0.641*** (-8.81) 
SIZE -0.107*** (-7.82) -0.073*** (-3.87) 
TANG 39.763*** (10.33) 37.160*** (15.96) 
GROWTH 0.3512** (1.81) 0.523*** (6.24) 
Year dummy Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes 
   
Specification tests   
Sargan 674.61 (0.456) 578.89(0.642) 
AR 1  -1.623 (0.045)** 
AR 2  0.939 (0.348) 
Note: Dependent variable = LEVE; t-statistics in brackets, *, **, and *** denote the statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent 
(two tailed) test levels, respectively. 
 
 As for robustness check, the study re-estimates dynamic panel model by using Difference GMM. Table 4 
shows the results of estimations of dynamic panel model by conducting Difference GMM. Difference GMM is applied 
because it can remove time-invariant fixed effect and it uses level of the lagged dependent variable to instrument the 
first difference of the lag (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The study employs both one-step and two-step for robust check. 
Consistent with System GMM, the coefficient estimation of lagged dependent from Difference GMM suggest a 
different adjustment speed within the respective groups. Table 4 indicates that Malaysian public listed firms adjust 
debt towards an optimal level and the spend of adjustment is approximately 41 per cent to 42 per cent per annum. The 
findings also show that two-step difference GMM is more efficient as compared to one-step. According to Arellano 
and Bond (1991), in two-step, the residuals obtained in the first step are used to construct a consistent estimate of the 
variance-covariance matrix, thus relaxing the assumptions of independence and homoskedasticity.  
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 Table 4: Dynamic Panel Data Analysis (Difference GMM) 
Variables One-step Difference GMM Two-step Difference GMM 
Intercept -2.855***(-6.88) -3.299***(-7.81) 
LEVEt-1 0.582***(3.84) 0.589***(3.68) 
OC5 0.438***(3.23) 0.247***(3.64) 
ROA -0.600***(-7.18) -0.459***(-6.69) 
SIZE -0.115***(-7.26) -0.099***(-6.09) 
TANG 48.435(10.14) 50.645***(18.72) 
GROWTH 0.566***(2.69) 0.715***(6.99) 
Year dummy Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes 
   
Specification tests   
Sargan 396.41 (0.304) 58.95(0.696) 
AR 1  -1.69(0.089)* 
AR 2  0.733(0.463) 
Note: Dependent variable = LEVE; t-statistics in brackets, *, **, and *** denote the statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent 
(two tailed) test levels, respectively. 
 
5. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
This study conducts a different study by estimating the dynamic relationship of lagged leverage decision (LEVEt-
1) to leverage decision for the period of 2004 to 2013 in Malaysia. The findings agree with the dynamic nature of 
leverage decision and it is consistent with previous studies in this area (Ebrahim et al., 2014; Flannery and Hankins, 
2013; Flannery and Rangan, 2006). In other words, the result appears to support the concept of lagged firm leverage 
as determinants of firm leverage decision. This also indicates that Malaysian public listed firms adjust their leverage 
and change their financing following temporary deviations in order to return leverage towards its target. The result is 
consistent with Abdeljawad et al. (2013), Haron (2014) and Ebrahim et al. (2014) who argue that Malaysian firms 
will estimate the speed of adjustment for leverage ratios. 
This research provides methodological implications by employing dynamic panel approach. The panel model 
allows for dynamic in the underlying process may be crucial for recovering consistent estimates of other parameters. 
The dynamic relationships are characterized by the presence of a lagged dependent variable among regressors. The 
results based on dynamic panel models are very impressive and value of 0.05 or less indicate a good fit of the model 
to the data. Critically, though, the results of this study pave the way for a more mixed method approach to firm leverage 
decision in Malaysia. A supporting quantitative study may utilize some of the concerns made here and explore the 
meanings attached to constructs chosen. 
Like most studies, this study is subject to some limitations. First, the study uses total debt to total assets as leverage 
measurement. However, some Malaysian public listed companies do not use debts as their external financing decision. 
Instead, they either use internal financing or external equity financing as their financial structure. Thus, the study 
would have to exclude those companies who are in this category. Again, it reduces the overall observation. Second, 
the sample of this research is derived from the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia (Stock Exchange of Malaysia) and thus 
excluded companies that were not listed in the Bursa Malaysia. Not only that, the study also excludes firms from 
finance, insurance and unit trust companies due to differences in regulatory requirement. Consequently, 
generalizations from the findings of this research to all companies in Malaysia cannot be made. 
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